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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: 
HAVE THE FEDERAL COURTS REACHED A CONSENSUS 
ON HOW TO INTERPRET TITLE VII CLAIMS ALLEGED BY 
PLAINTIFFS WHO IDENTIFY AS LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, OR 
TRANSGENDER? 
 




 Discrimination, especially when it occurs in the workplace, is a controversial and 
complicated subject that society has struggled to overcome for many years.1  When workplace 
discrimination is directed towards those who identify as Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, or Transgender 
(LGBT), employment discrimination becomes even more complex.2  Employment discrimination 
is complex because the federal statute that prohibits discrimination based on sex does not address 
workplace discrimination against those who identify as LGBT.3  Many within the LGBT 
community have attempted, with varying levels of success, to use statutes and inventive legal 
theories to further their suits that allege workplace discrimination.4  For instance, transgender 
plaintiffs typically argue, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), that 
employment discrimination occurred because of gender.5  On the other hand, gay or lesbian 
plaintiffs typically argue under Title VII that employment discrimination occurred because of 
their sexual orientation or lack of gender conformity.6  This paper will examine the federal 
statute most commonly used in LGBT employment-discrimination cases, Title VII, by analyzing 
and discussing federal case law to determine the current state of employment-discrimination 
claims made by LGBT individuals. 
 
 Determining the current state of the law as it pertains to employment discrimination 
against LGBT individuals requires several steps.  Section II will discuss the history of Title VII 
and the steps Congress took to pass it.  Section II will further elaborate on the amendments made 
                                                
1 See Judy Bennett Garner & Sandy James, Employment Discrimination Against LGBTQ Persons, 14 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 363, 365-69 (2013). 
2 See Jennifer C. Pizer et al., Evidence of Persistent and Pervasive Workplace Discrimination Against LGBT People: 
The Need for Federal Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination and Providing for Equal Employment Benefits, 45 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715, 728-31 (2012). 
3 E.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221-22 (10th Cir. 2007); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling 
Co., 260 F.3d 257, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2001). 
4 E.g. Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874-75 (9th Cir. 2001); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic 
Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259-61 (1st Cir. 1999). 
5 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 (2009); E.g., Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 736-38 (6th 
Cir. 2005); Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Grp., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 657-59 (S.D. Tex. 2008); 
Garner & James, supra note 1, at 370-71. 
6 E.g., Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 286-87 (3d Cir. 2009); Heller v. Columbia Edgewater 
Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1217 (D. Or. 2002). 
 
   
to Title VII that are pertinent to LGBT individuals and briefly discuss the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  Section III will briefly discuss how the disparate treatment 
and disparate impact theories affect court decisions and discuss cases heard by the Supreme 
Court, circuit courts, and district courts that deal with the issues LGBT individuals face in Title 
VII employment-discrimination claims.  Section IV will conclude this article by discussing the 
current state of LGBT discrimination claims under Title VII. 
 
II.  A Short History of Title VII 
 
A.  The creation of Title VII 
 
 Title VII’s creation was neither easy nor short; it passed only after a great deal of debate 
and opposition from many members of Congress.7  The 1950s and 1960s saw the strengthening 
of the Civil Rights Movement and the public’s growing desire for equality for all; these events 
placed a great deal of pressure on Congress to enact legislation that could help level the playing 
field for all residents of the United States.8  Despite the enactment of several statutes in the 1950s 
and early 1960s that were designed to displace employment discrimination, they were largely 
unsuccessful.9  However, in the early 1960s, several key Congressional members and the 
President of the United States began to apply even greater pressure on Congress to pass a more 
comprehensive civil rights statute.10 
 
 At the time of Title VII’s passage, the political landscape was very complex.11  Because 
of Title VII’s complex political nature, Title VII’s wording was constantly changing in order to 
garner enough support to pass through both houses of Congress; others proposed language 
changes in an effort to defeat the bill.12  For instance, one Congressman made an attempt to 
block Title VII from being passed into law during its final considerations by adding the phrase 
“because of sex” to Title VII’s language.13  He was unsuccessful, however, for Title VII did pass 
in both houses of Congress with the added language.14 
 
 Throughout Title VII's existence, courts have opined that this one phrase, “because of 
sex,” was meant only to provide protection for a person’s gender, not for a person’s sexual 
orientation.15  Dissenters of this consistent judicial perspective argue, however, that the creation 
of Title VII was meant to protect all those within the United States from multiple forms of 
                                                
7 See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New 
Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV1417, 1423-25 (2003). 
8 ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AND EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 41-42 (1993). 
9 See id. at 42-43. 
10 See id. at 43-45. 
11 See id. at 43-52. 
12 See id. at 45-52. 
13 See id. at 45. 
14 ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AND EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 45 (1993). 
15 Garner & James, supra note 1, at 369-70. 
   
discrimination and to correct the many discrepancies faced by minority groups in daily life.16  
Under this latter view, Title VII’s protections should extend to LGBT individuals.17 
 
B.  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
  
 Congress originally only authorized the EEOC to investigate, accept claims, and create 
reports on Title VII discrimination.18  But when Congress made additions to Title VII in 1972, 
the EEOC’s authority was expanded to include having the ability to file suit on behalf of an 
employee who had been discriminated against by a non-government employer.19  Congress felt, 
when passing the amendments to Title VII in 1972, that the EEOC did not have the adequate 
authority to effectively investigate allegations and enforce its findings.20  Congress remedied 
these concerns, in part, by giving the EEOC the power to bring suit against private companies 
that were allegedly in violation of Title VII; Congress further expanded Title VII’s scope by 
allowing discrimination cases originating from local and state governments to be considered 
under Title VII.21 
 
 The EEOC has provided guidance on what it considers to be sexual harassment and how 
an employee should be able to prove his or her employment-discrimination case under Title 
VII.22  However, the EEOC’s powers are limited in many respects because the EEOC’s opinions 
and guidance regarding sex discrimination are only considered to be persuasive authority and are 
not binding upon any United States court.23 
 
C.  The Civil Rights Act of 1991 as a clarification and strengthening of Title VII 
  
 The enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 stemmed from several factors that 
included the court system’s interpretation of Title VII gender harassment.24  Congress felt that 
the court system was not correctly interpreting Title VII because of court decisions such as Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.25  The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Price Waterhouse, that an 
employer could avoid liability for sex discrimination if it could show that it would have made the 
                                                
16 See Cody Perkins, Sex and Sexual Orientation: Title VII After Macy v. Holder, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 427, 428-29 
(2013). 
17 See id. at 428 (explaining that evolving interpretations of Title VII's "because of sex" provision were expanded to 
include discrimination based on sex stereotyping). 
18 Anne Noel Occhialino & Daniel Vail, The 40th Anniversary of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Symposium: Why the EEOC (Still) Matters, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 671, 672-73 (2005). 
19 See Occhialino & Vail, supra note 18, at 677. 
20 20 See id. 
21 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 (2009); see Occhialino & Vail, supra note 18, at 677-78 (noting that the amendments 
expanding Title VII's coverage hampered the EEOC's ability to manage its caseload). 
22 See generally Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. §1604.11 (1999). 
23 Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1937, 1938-39 
(2006). 
24 Civil Rights Act of 1991 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228, 239-41(1989). 
25 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239-41; see Occhialino & Vail, supra note 18, at 686-87 ((describing three statutes, 
including the Civil Rights Act of 1991, that Congress enacted that impacted the EEOC's enforcement efforts). 
   
same decision in any event, was rejected by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.26  The Supreme 
Court’s decisions during this time period, which included Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, created 
a disparity for plaintiffs when they attempted to obtain a remedy in sexual harassment cases.27  
Because of the lack of a remedy for a plaintiff’s damages in sexual harassment cases, the public 
put great pressure on Congress in 1991 to correct and amend the court system’s interpretation of 
Title VII sexual harassment claims.28  The public was further concerned as a result of Justice 
Thomas’s confirmation hearing for the Supreme Court, where sexual harassment allegations 
were made against him.29  As a result of the public’s pressure to amend Title VII, Congress 
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991.30 
 
 The Civil Rights Act of 1991, in addition to doing away with a mixed-motive defense, 
provided further protections against sexual harassment in the workplace by allowing punitive and 
compensatory damages to be awarded in certain circumstances.31  The Civil Rights Act of 1991 
was also meant to address the extension of gender protections in the workplace to assist in 
preventing discrimination.32 
 
III. Case Law Examining Alleged Employment-Discrimination of LGBT 
Individuals Under Title VII 
  
 This section will briefly discuss the differences between disparate treatment and disparate 
impact theories of discrimination.  This section will also present the federal court cases that have 
played a role in Title VII interpretation related to employment discrimination alleged by LGBT 
individuals in three subsections that examine relevant Supreme Court decisions, relevant 
appellate decisions, and relevant district court decisions.33 
 
A.  Disparate treatment and disparate impact 
 
 Disparate treatment and disparate impact are two theories courts use to reach a 
conclusion concerning alleged employment discrimination.  As defined by the Supreme Court, 
disparate impact involves “practices that are not intended to discriminate but in fact have a 
disproportionately adverse effect on minorities.”34  Disparate treatment, on the other hand, is 
defined by the Supreme Court as behavior that “occur[s] where an employer has ‘treated [a] 
particular person less favorably than others because of’ a particular trait.”35 
                                                
26 Civil Rights Act of 1991 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240-41; 
BLUMROSEN, supra note 8, at 285. 
27 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258; Id. at 259 (White, concurring); see BLUMROSEN, supra note 8, at 282-85. 
28 BLUMROSEN, supra note 8, at 284-85. 
29 See id. at 284. 
30 See id. 
31 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); BLUMROSEN, supra note 8, at 285. 
32 BLUMROSEN, supra note 8, at 285. 
33 E.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 
1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002). 
34 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009). 
35 Id. (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 985-86 (1988)). 
   
 LGBT individuals do not use the disparate-impact theory as often as they use disparate 
treatment in Title VII employment-discrimination claims.36  Disparate treatment is used in LGBT 
workplace-discrimination cases because the treatment is generally far more explicit.37  There are 
instances, however, where employers exhibit disparate impact-like behavior when making 
employment decisions associated with these individuals.38  For instance, an employer concerned 
about potential litigation could, as noted in Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, inadvertently affect 
an LGBT individual by instituting a policy that unwittingly discriminates against an LGBT 
individual.39  The court in Etsitty stated that “[i]t may be that use of the women’s restroom is an 
inherent part of one’s identity as a male-to-female transexual and that a prohibition on such use 
discriminates on the basis of one’s status as a transsexual.”40 
 
B.  The foundations of Title VII interpretation in the federal court system 
 
 The United States Supreme Court cases discussed in this section have played a pivotal 
role in interpreting Title VII suits that allege employment-discrimination against LGBT 
individuals.41 
 
1. Griggs v. Duke Power Company: The inception of the disparate-impact test.42 
 
 In the history of Title VII employment-discrimination interpretation, Griggs was the first 
Supreme Court decision that shaped how disparate impact could be used in workplace-
discrimination claims under Title VII.43  The case arose when Duke Power Company (Duke) 
created two aptitude tests and a transfer requirement, hoping to produce a way to determine 
which employees were best suited for promotion or transfer to another division within Duke.44  
On its face, the testing requirement was not discriminatory, nor was there any apparent intent to 
discriminate.45  Before the passage of Title VII, Duke openly discriminated against its African 
American employees.46  But in 1955, Duke did create a policy requiring a high school diploma 
for any transfer or appointment to all departments within Duke, excluding the labor department, 
which constituted all of Duke’s African American employees.47 
                                                
36 See Daniel M. Le Vay, Sex Discrimination in Job Assignment or Transfer as Violation of Title VII of Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.), 123 A.L.R. FED. 1, 18 (1995). 
37 See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 2001); Le Vay, supra note 36, at 18. 
38 See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1218-20 (10th Cir. 2007); Le Vay, supra note 36, at 18. 
39 See Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1219, 1224. 
40 See id. at 1224. 
41 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Harris v. Foklift Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. 17 (1994); Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
42 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425-26. 
43 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427-28 (discussing the enactment history of 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 (2009) and its 
relevance to an organization’s testing and requirement standards). 
44 See id. 
45 See id. at 428. 
46 See id. at 426-27 (discussing the actions of companies before the enactment of 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 
(2009)). 
47 See id. at 427. 
   
 When Title VII was passed and became effective, Duke required those who were 
employed in the labor department who desired a transfer or a promotion to another department to 
hold a high school diploma as well as take and obtain a satisfactory score on two tests.48  Duke 
allegedly created the employment requirements to ensure that the performance of an employee in 
a new department at Duke would be satisfactory.49 
 
 The tests and education requirements proved to be discriminatory, however, towards 
Duke’s African American employees.50  The tests were discriminatory because African 
Americans had received an inferior education and as a result, they were not adequately prepared 
to take an aptitude test.51  The test did not measure skills related to performance of the specific 
jobs.52  Because of this policy’s impact, the African American employees at Duke collectively 
filed suit against Duke, alleging that Duke’s tests and requirements were discriminatory under 
Title VII.53  The district court proclaimed that since Title VII was only meant to be prospective 
and not retrospective, and because Duke had not intentionally committed discrimination against 
its African American employees, Duke would prevail in the case.54 
 
 Griggs appealed the district court’s decision, where the circuit court partially reversed the 
district court’s decision, noting that discrimination on the part of an employer before the passing 
of Title VII could still be actionable if the discrimination was residual.55  The circuit court, 
however, maintained that it must be shown that there was racial purpose or an intent that was evil 
in the creation of a set of requirements by an employer for Griggs’s claims to be applicable under 
Title VII.56  Because of the conflicting views held throughout the federal court system, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.57 
 
 The Supreme Court opined that the tests and requirements of an organization must be fair 
in how they are applied and how they are used in practice; that a test or requirement must be 
related to a job to be legitimate; that a business must show it had a legitimate business reason in 
using a test or requirement; and that the business reason had to be connected to the result of a test 
or requirement.58  Because Duke failed to show how its promotion requirements were job related, 
the Court proclaimed Duke discriminated against African Americans.59 
 
                                                
48 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427-428 (1971).(discussing the actions of certain organizations before 
the enactment of 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 (2009)). 
49 See id. at 431. 
50 See id. at 430. 
51 See id. 
52 S e e  i d .  a t  4 2 8 .  
53 See id. at 425-26 (discussing Congress’s inclusion of class action lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 
(2009)). 
54 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 428-29 (1971). 
55 See id at 429. 
56 See id. (discussing the circuit courts’ interpretation of Congress’s intent regarding 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 
(2009)). 
57 See id. 
58 See id. at 431-34. 
59 See id. at 436. 
   
 Griggs is an important decision for all plaintiffs because it provides a way for plaintiffs to 
show how they have been discriminated against in the workplace under a theory other than 
disparate treatment.60  In Griggs, the Court created and used disparate impact for the first time by 
recognizing that Duke's standardized tests caused many African Americans to be excluded from 
certain jobs, despite being capable of performing the jobs, because of poor education.61  
Furthermore, Griggs helped to protect minority groups from discrimination in the workplace 
under Title VII by requiring an employer to provide a legitimate business reason for any 
requirements or tests used by the employer.62 
 
 2.  McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green: Shifting burdens of proof.63 
 
 When considering Supreme Court cases that affect claims of Title VII employment 
discrimination, McDonnell Douglas Corp. has provided an important foundation for plaintiffs to 
prove an allegation of disparate-treatment workplace discrimination.64  Green was laid off by 
McDonnell Douglas, and because of this layoff, Green began organizing and implementing 
demonstrations at the McDonnell Douglas plant.65  When several new positions at McDonnell 
Douglas were created, Green applied for these positions, but McDonnell Douglas decided not to 
reemploy Green because of his involvement in the demonstrations.66  Green brought suit against 
McDonnell Douglas citing, in part, racial discrimination on the part of McDonnell Douglas for 
refusing to rehire Green.67  The district court ruled in favor of McDonnell Douglas by citing the 
EEOC’s failure to find discrimination against Green as well as Green’s participation in the 
demonstrations against McDonnell Douglas; Green appealed the district court’s decision.68  The 
circuit court, proclaiming that a claim did not require, as a prerequisite for jurisdiction, the 
EEOC’s finding of cause, affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s decision and 
remanded the case to the district court for further consideration of Green’s discrimination 
claim.69  Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court.70 
 
 The majority created a test of shifting burdens to determine the reasons for the 
employer’s actions.71  First, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by 
denoting: 
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was 
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; 
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, 
after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer 
                                                
60 See id. at 431. 
61 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). 
62 See id. at 31. 
63 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
64 Id. At 807 
65 See id. at 794. 
66 See id. 
67 See id. 
68 See id. 
69 See id. at 797-98. 
70 S e e McDonnel Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 798. 
71 See id. at 802. 
   
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s 
qualifications.72 
  
 Second, the employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reason for 
its decision.73  Third, the plaintiff must prove the employer’s articulated reason is nothing more 
than a pretext for discrimination.74  And fourth, the employer must show a legitimate reason that 
is untainted by discrimination for the denial of a person’s employment.75 
 
 In coming to a determination, the majority opined that Green should have been afforded 
more time to rebut McDonnell Douglas’s assertions, that Title VII did not tolerate race 
discrimination in any form, and that McDonnell Douglas was factually different from Griggs in 
that Griggs dealt with education and testing, while McDonnell Douglas dealt with the unlawful 
actions of Green.76  The majority opined that McDonnell Douglas did not decide whether to hire 
Green based on his qualifications, but because of Green’s actions prior to his attempt to be 
rehired.77  McDonnell Douglas is important for plaintiffs and defendants because it created a 
shifting burden of proof requirement when plaintiffs are attempting to prove a case of disparate-
treatment employment discrimination under Title VII.78 
 
 3.  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A failure to conform to gender stereotypes.79 
 
 Price Waterhouse assisted LGBT individuals by demonstrating that discrimination 
because of gender stereotypes is a triable issue under Title VII.80  While working at Price 
Waterhouse, Hopkins attempted to gain full partnership, but was ultimately denied because she 
failed to conform to common female stereotypes and behaviors.81  Hopkins did receive high 
praise from various partners within Price Waterhouse, but there were many within the firm who 
had concerns that Hopkins’s behavior was too masculine and not feminine enough.82 
 
 In making its determination in favor of Hopkins, the majority proclaimed that an 
employer could not make an employment decision based solely on gender; that an employer 
could not make an employment decision of a mixed nature, in that an employer cannot make an 
employment decision based on reasons that would be considered of both a legitimate and 
illegitimate determination; that an employer could not take an adverse action against an 
employee or applicant based on gender without a valid business reason; and that an employee 
                                                
72 See id. 
73 See id. at 802-03. 
74 See id. at 804. 
75 See id. 
76 See id. at 804-06; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 435-36 (1971) (explaining that Title VII does not 
preclude the use of testing procedures, but it does forbid giving those procedures controlling force when they are not 
a reasonable measure of job performance). 
77 See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 806. 
78 See id. at 807 (stating that Green was allowed to bring forth his claim under 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 (2009)). 
79 See  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
80 See id. at 258 (stating that gender stereotypes made by an organization for the purpose of hiring or promoting a 
person is considered discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 (2009)). 
81 See id.  at 231-33. 
82 See id. at 234-35. 
   
must show that an employer made a decision that affected the employee because of gender.83  In 
essence, the majority opined that employment decisions based on gender without a valid business 
reason constitute discrimination due to Title VII’s wording that, in part, states that discrimination 
cannot take place “. . . because of such individual’s . . . sex.”84 
 
 4.  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.: Same-gender discrimination.85 
 
 The Supreme Court’s determination in Oncale has proven to be an important decision for 
LGBT individuals who allege same-gender harassment in the workplace.86  Oncale authorized 
plaintiffs to bring same-sex discrimination suits if they could show they were discriminated 
against by coworkers of the same gender because of a lack of gender conformity.87  The ability to 
bring same-sex discrimination suits has helped to resolve employment-discrimination cases 
alleged by LGBT individuals.88 
 
 Oncale worked on an oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico and experienced adverse actions that 
were sexual in nature from three coworkers of the same gender.89  Oncale reported the 
harassment to his supervisors, but nothing was done to rectify the situation.90  Eventually, Oncale 
left his job on the oil rig, noting the high level of stress and constant harassment as his reasons 
for quitting.91 
 
 The Supreme Court determined, in part, that under Title VII, females and males are 
equally protected and that a party is protected from discrimination that originates from an 
employee of the same gender.92  The majority reasoned there are times when a court must go 
beyond what Congress intended to do with a statute in order to apply the law fairly and equally 
to those parties who file a claim.93 
 
 Oncale’s employer argued that by extending Title VII rights to cases such as Oncale, the 
Court would be creating a statute of general courtesy.94  The majority opined, however, that such 
assertions were groundless because Title VII protections already encompassed sexual harassment 
towards those of the opposite gender.95  The majority noted that the requirements of Title VII 
                                                
83 McDonnel Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. 792, at 244-47, 250. 
84 See id. at 240 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2(a)(1), (2) (2009)). 
85 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 75 (1998). 
86 See id. at 82. 
87 See id. at 80-81. 
88 See Garner & James, supra note 1, at 371-72. 
89 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 77 (1998). 
90 See id. 
91 See id. 
92 See id. at 78 (noting that 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 (2009) covers both men and women in regards to disparate 
treatment in employment). 
93 See id. at 79-80. 
94 See id. at 80 (stating that a person must still prove all of the requirements set forth by 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 
(2009) in order to show employment discrimination). 
95 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (stating that 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 
(2009) provides protection for both men and women). 
   
must be met and proven in order for a claim to move forward.96  Furthermore, the Court 
maintained that Title VII  does not protect an employee from teasing or horseplay from co-
workers, but instead protects an employee from same-sex harassment that could adversely and 
pervasively alter the employee’s conditions of employment.97  In conclusion, the majority ruled 
that when considering claims of sexual harassment under Title VII, such claims should be 
distinguished correctly from behaviors between those of the same sex that are meant to be jokes 
or rowdiness by undertaking a measure of prudence while examining the context of a case as it is 
related to society.98 
 
 5.  Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson:  Sexual harassment from a supervisor.99 
 
 The Court’s decision in Meritor Savings Bank has allowed LGBT individuals to bring a 
claim based on sex discrimination that creates a hostile workplace environment.100  Mechelle 
Vinson worked for the Meritor Savings Bank (the Bank) and alleged that she had been sexually 
harassed by her supervisor, Taylor.101  Vinson asserted that Taylor subjected her to various 
sexual acts that included inappropriate fondling, touching, and sexual favors so that, in Vinson’s 
opinion, she could remain employed.102  Vinson eventually decided to take an indefinite period 
of time off, but the Bank discharged Vinson two months after her leave began because of 
excessive use of sick leave.103  Vinson filed suit against the Bank and Taylor, alleging that she 
had been sexually harassed by Taylor in violation of Title VII.104 
 
 The trial court found that Taylor’s actions had not violated Title VII; Vinson appealed the 
decision to the court of appeals, where the trial court’s findings were reversed.105  The Bank then 
appealed the appellate court’s decision to the Supreme Court.106  The Court opined that Title VII 
was meant to prevent the disparate treatment of all women and men in the workplace.107  The 
Court further noted that there were EEOC guidelines that defined sexual harassment under Title 
VII that were similar in nature to what Vinson had experienced.108 
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 Because the EEOC guidelines were created with case law in mind and were consistently 
used by courts in Title VII hostile employment cases, the Court maintained the guidance was 
valid.109  The Court further concluded that Vinson showed how the harassment in her work 
environment had been sufficiently pervasive and severe to cause a working environment that was 
abusive, thus causing the alteration of her employment conditions.110  In order for conduct to be 
unwelcome, the Court noted, a person must indicate through action or word that said conduct 
was unwelcome.111  Therefore, the Court held that Vinson did have an actionable claim under 
Title VII for sex discrimination that caused a hostile work environment.112 
 
 6.  Harris v. Forklift System, Inc.:  An abusive work environment because of gender.113 
 
 Teresa Harris worked for Forklift Systems, Inc. (Forklift) as a manager and was 
consistently harassed by the president of Forklift, Charles Hardy, because of her gender.114  
Harris alleged that Hardy’s harassment included sexually demeaning comments based on her 
gender.115  Harris quit her job at Forklift because of Hardy’s harassment and proceeded to file 
suit under Title VII for abusive work environment based on gender.116  The trial court did not 
find in favor of Harris, reasoning that Hardy’s behavior did not affect Harris’s psychological 
well-being in a serious manner.117  Harris appealed the trial court’s decision, but the appellate 
court upheld the lower court’s decision.118  The Supreme Court granted certiorari.119 
 
 The Court opined that Title VII encompasses all disparate treatment of women and men 
in the workplace and that Title VII is violated when an employee’s actions in the workplace are 
pervasive or severe enough to affect another employee’s work environment.120  The Court further 
noted that Title VII does not require the psychological well-being of a person to be affected 
seriously by the harassment or require a person to succumb to a nervous breakdown.121  The 
hostile work environment test, the Court maintained, was not a precise test, but was instead 
meant to examine cases on an individual level to determine if Title VII had been violated.122  
Because the lower courts failed to properly consider the appropriate hostile work environment 
test in Harris’s case, the Court reversed the appellate court’s decision.123 
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 7.  Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth:  Quitting because of sexual harassment.124 
 
 Kimberly Ellerth worked for Burlington Industries (Burlington) as a salesperson where 
she experienced verbal and physical sexual harassment from a supervisor.125  Ellerth never 
informed her superiors about the sexual harassment, and she eventually decided to leave 
Burlington’s employment because of the continuing harassment.126  Ellerth then filed suit 
alleging, among several charges, that one of Burlington’s supervisors had committed sexual 
harassment and had thus created a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII.127  The 
trial court, finding that there was no triable issue and that Ellerth had failed to report the 
supervisor’s behavior, granted summary judgment in favor of Burlington.128  Ellerth appealed the 
trial court’s decision, and the court of appeals reversed, citing vicarious liability on the part of 
Burlington as the essence of the suit brought forth by Ellerth.129  Burlington appealed the 
decision to the Supreme Court.130 
 
 The Court maintained that in order for vicarious liability to apply to an employer in a 
Title VII hostile-work-environment case, a supervisor must have control over an employee that is 
immediate.131  The Court proclaimed that if there are no tangible employment actions taken 
against an employee by an employer, the employer could use an affirmative defense consisting 
of two elements to show by a preponderance of the evidence that vicarious liability did not apply 
to the employer.132  The two elements of this defense, the Court asserted, required: 
 
(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and 
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the 
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any 
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or 
to avoid harm otherwise.133 
 
 The Court noted, however, that when there is an employment action that tangibly results 
in a discharge, when there is a reassignment that is not desirable by an employee, or when there 
is a discharge of the employee, an affirmative defense could not be used by the employer.134  The 
Court determined that Burlington was liable for the supervisor’s alleged actions based on the 
theory of vicarious liability because the supervisor’s alleged actions led to Ellerth’s decision to 
leave Burlington’s employment.135  Burlington Industries is an important vicarious liability case 
because the Court specified what is required for vicarious liability to apply in an employment 
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context.136  In essence, the Court created a new employment discrimination test based on 
vicarious liability that would allow plaintiffs to show how they had been discriminated against in 
the workplace.137 
 
 8.  Faragher v. City of Boca Raton:  Sexual harassment at the city pool.138 
 
 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton is a companion case to Burlington Industries, Inc. v. 
Ellerth because both cases deal with vicarious liability and because the Supreme Court 
considered and rendered an opinion on both cases at the same time.139  Faragher, like Burlington 
Industries, Inc., is an important vicarious liability case that has helped plaintiffs to apply 
vicarious liability to an employer, or its agents, that has allegedly committed workplace 
discrimination.140  Beth Faragher worked for the city of Boca Raton as a lifeguard.141  While 
working for Boca Raton, Faragher alleged that two of her supervisors verbally harassed her and 
other female lifeguards in a sexual manner, thus adversely affecting the privileges, terms, and 
conditions of Faragher’s employment.142 
 
 Faragher quit her job at Boca Raton because of her supervisors’ behavior; she filed suit 
against Boca Raton and her supervisors alleging sexual harassment and hostile work 
environment under Title VII.143  The trial court ruled in Faragher’s favor, noting that the 
supervisors’ behavior did alter Faragher’s employment in its conditions and therefore constituted 
an abusive working environment.144  Boca Raton appealed the trial court’s ruling, and the circuit 
reversed.145  The Supreme Court then granted certiorari.146 
 
 The Court maintained that in order for vicarious liability to apply to an employer in a 
Title VII hostile work environment suit, a supervisor must have immediate control over an 
employee.147  The Court proclaimed that if an employer took no tangible employment actions 
against an employee, the employer could use an affirmative defense consisting of two elements 
to show by a preponderance of the evidence that vicarious liability did not apply to the 
employer.148  The two elements of this defense, the Court announced, require: 
 
(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and 
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the 
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any 
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preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or 
to avoid harm otherwise.149 
 
 The Court, however, noted that when there is an employment action that tangibly results 
in a discharge, when there is a reassignment that is not desirable by an employee, or when there 
is a discharge of the employee, the affirmative defense could not be used by the employer.150  
The Court reversed the appellate court’s decision because Faragher’s supervisors had complete 
authority to oversee and direct Faragher; the Court also noted that Faragher was not aware of 
Boca Raton’s anti-harassment policies and could not reasonably report the supervisors’ behavior, 
thus subjecting Boca Raton to liability under Title VII.151  The Court further maintained that the 
actions of Faragher’s supervisors rose to the necessary level of an actionable case, in that the 
supervisors actions were sufficiently adverse to create a hostile work environment claim under 
Title VII, thus subjecting Boca Raton to vicarious liability.152 
 
C.  Appellate court cases associated with LGBT employment-discrimination claims 
under Title VII 
 
 This subsection will introduce the case facts of a select number of federal circuit-court-
employment-discrimination cases brought by LGBT individuals.153 
 
1. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati: A case of command presence.154 
 
 In this Sixth Circuit case, the court made a determination that showed how a person could 
prove an allegation of employment discrimination based on gender under Title VII.155  Barnes, 
who was making the transition from male to female, worked for the Cincinnati Police 
Department (CPD) when she successfully passed CPD’s sergeant examination; she was 
subsequently promoted to the rank of sergeant on a probationary basis.156  During Barnes’s 
probation, she was systematically discriminated against when CPD treated and evaluated her 
differently than other probationary sergeants because Barnes’s behavior did not fall within 
typical male stereotypes.157  When Barnes’s probationary period was complete, CPD failed 
Barnes, citing a lack of command presence.158 
 
 Barnes brought suit against the city of Cincinnati alleging that CPD had committed 
sexual discrimination under Title VII based on her lack of gender conformity.159  At the 
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conclusion of trial, the jury decided in favor of Barnes.160  The city of Cincinnati then appealed 
the jury’s decision to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.161  By using the test created in 
McDonnell Douglas, the majority proclaimed that Barnes had shown how she had been 
discriminated against by CPD when it refused to allow Barnes’s promotion to remain in effect.162 
 
 After considering all of the facts and case law, which included Smith v. City of Salem 
(discussed below), the majority declared that Barnes was a member of a protected class; that 
Barnes did not have to present an exact match between her treatment and the treatment of her 
coworkers; that Barnes had adequately proven her claims for discrimination under Title VII; and 
that Barnes had properly presented and argued her discrimination claim.163  For the above-stated 
reasons, the majority affirmed the jury’s findings.164  Barnes is an excellent example of how an 
LGBT individual can make a successful claim under Title VII while showing how to properly 
present and argue a case of Title VII employment discrimination.165 
 
2. Smith v. City of Salem: Trying to put out a fire.166 
 
 There are times when transgender individuals receive the brunt of employment 
discrimination, especially when transitioning from male to female or female to male.  
Discrimination against these parties can be acute because it can be hard for them to fit into a 
typical gender profile.  Smith worked for the Salem, Ohio Fire Department as a firefighter.167  
Several of Smith’s coworkers started to notice a change in Smith when she began transitioning 
from male to female.168  In an attempt to prevent any problems from occurring, Smith went to a 
supervisor to explain the situation.169  However, Smith’s supervisor decided to inform the Fire 
Department’s chief, who then collaborated with several other city officials in an attempt to force 
Smith to quit because of Smith’s gender non-conformity.170  Despite these attempts, Smith did 
not quit, nor was she fired.171 
 
 In making a determination of Smith’s discrimination claim, the majority opined that 
Smith had shown that her actions were protected under Title VII; that the Salem Fire Department 
was aware of Smith’s protected behavior; that the Fire Department acted adversely towards 
Smith despite its awareness of her protected behavior; and that Smith had been able to show an 
affiliation between her protected actions and the Fire Department’s detrimental actions.172  The 
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majority also found that the Salem Fire Department’s actions were due to Smith’s failure to fit 
into a typical gender stereotype.173  Furthermore, the majority found that because of Smith’s 
work suspension, the Salem Fire Department’s actions did establish a negative effect on the 
conditions and terms of Smith’s employment.174 
 
3. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority: Barred from using certain restrooms.175 
 
 Discrimination against LGBT individuals in the workplace can be commonplace, but 
sometimes, transgender individuals who are making the transition from male to female or female 
to male face stronger discrimination because of a lack of gender conformity.  Etsitty began 
working as a bus driver at the Utah Transit Authority (UTA).176  Because Etsitty was in the 
process of transitioning from male to female, she was using female restrooms while on her bus 
route.177  Out of concern that Etsitty’s restroom usage could create litigation because she was still 
biologically male, UTA decided to release Etsitty from its employment, despite Etsitty’s 
unblemished employment record.178 
 
 The majority opined, through the use of precedent that included McDonnell Douglas, that 
Etsitty had failed to properly prove her case of employment discrimination under Title VII.179  
By using the McDonnell Douglas test, the majority maintained that UTA had a legitimate 
business reason for releasing Etsitty from its employment, in that UTA was concerned about 
possible litigation over Etsitty’s use of female restrooms during work hours when she was still 
technically a male.180  The majority further found that Etsitty had failed to rebut UTA’s genuine 
business reason for releasing Etsitty.181  Etsitty’s failure to rebut UTA’s assertions helps to show 
that a claim of this nature must be carefully crafted so that any assertion of a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment action made by an employer can be 
properly rebutted while showing that discrimination under Title VII did occur against an LGBT 
individual.182 
 
 4.  Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc.: A burger, with a side of 
discrimination.183 
 
 At times, discrimination in the workplace can be pervasive, especially when a person 
fails to conform to certain stereotypes associated with his or her gender.  This was especially true 
for Sanchez, who worked as a waiter at an Azteca restaurant, where many of his mannerisms did 
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not fit within the male norm.184  While working at Azteca, Sanchez was persistently harassed by 
coworkers and a supervisor because of his mannerisms.185  Sanchez told his coworkers to stop, 
considered such behavior to be unwelcome, and reported the harassment to his supervisors.186  
But little was done about Sanchez’s situation, and he was eventually fired from Azteca for 
leaving work in the middle of his shift after a volatile argument with an assistant manager.187 
 
 After examining all of the evidence presented by Sanchez and the record of the trial 
court, the majority proclaimed that the behavior of Sanchez’s coworkers did constitute sexual 
harassment as defined by Title VII.188  The majority noted that the behavior of Sanchez’s 
coworkers was not welcome; that Sanchez had told his coworkers to desist from the offensive 
behavior; that Sanchez had reported the offensive behavior to his supervisors; that seen through 
the eyes of a reasonable person, the behavior committed by Sanchez’s coworkers could be seen 
as sexual harassment under Title VII; that Sanchez’s claims under Title VII were viable because 
of the decision made in Price Waterhouse, in that Sanchez’s behavior did not fall under typical 
male stereotypes; and that Sanchez had provided sufficient evidence to support his claim under 
Title VII.189  Thus, the majority proclaimed that Sanchez had a claim under Title VII for sexual 
harassment.190 
 
 5.  Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc.: Walking in the wrong way.191 
 
 Gender stereotyping can be quite pervasive in the workplace, especially when one 
considers the strength of gender roles within the United States.  Prowel worked for Wise 
Business Forms (Wise) on the production line.192  Because Prowel lacked gender conformity in 
the way that he acted and carried himself, several coworkers heckled and launched slurs at him 
and left sexually abusive material at Prowel’s workspace.193  Prowel met with Wise management 
in an attempt to solve the situation, but nothing was done about the harassment he experienced; 
citing a lack of available work at Wise, Prowel’s supervisors eventually fired him.194  Prowel 
brought suit against Wise, alleging sexual harassment under Title VII.195  Wise filed a motion for 
summary judgement after the completion of discovery, and the court granted Wise’s motion.196  
Prowel then appealed the court’s decision.197 
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 When considering Prowel’s case, the majority maintained that Prowel had submitted 
enough evidence to support his claim of sexual harassment under Title VII.198  However, because 
of the ambiguity of whether Prowel was discriminated against because of his sexual orientation 
or because he failed to conform to gender stereotypes, the case had to be considered by a jury.199  
Therefore, the majority remanded Prowel’s case to the district court for further consideration.200 
 
 6.  Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc.: The butler did it.201 
 
 In a workplace predominantly comprised of males, discrimination due to a lack of gender 
conformity can be very acute.  This fact was especially true for Rene, who worked as a butler at 
MGM Grand Hotel (MGM) with other male butlers.202  While employed at MGM, Rene was 
subjected to pervasive as well as continuous verbal and physical abuse that included touching in 
an extreme manner.203  Rene provided evidence that showed how the majority of his coworkers, 
including a supervisor, took part in the harassment, primarily because Rene was homosexual.204 
 
 In making a decision in favor of Rene, the majority disregarded sexual orientation in light 
of the pervasiveness of the harassment, noting that in cases involving women in similar 
situations, sexual orientation was irrelevant.205  Furthermore, by relying in part on Oncale, the 
majority opined that the behavior of Rene’s coworkers was based on Rene’s lack of gender 
conformity; that Rene’s coworkers’ behavior was both sexual and discriminatory in nature; and 
that the behavior of Rene’s coworkers fell under the types of behavior that are prohibited under 
Title VII.206 
 
 7.  Dawson v. Entek International: Harassment based on sexual orientation.207 
 
 Without properly pleading and arguing a Title VII discrimination case, an LGBT plaintiff 
has little hope of being successful in an attempt to sue an employer for harassment involving 
gender; Dawson is an example of such a situation.208  Dawson began working at Entek 
International (Entek) on a production line where several coworkers were already aware that 
Dawson was homosexual.209  Over a one-month period, Dawson experienced sexual harassment 
that included derogatory statements from his coworkers because of his sexual orientation, thus 
causing him a high level of stress.210  Because of this stress, Dawson decided to take one day 
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off.211  When Dawson returned to work the next day, he informed the human resources 
department at Entek about the sexual harassment he was experiencing.212  Entek fired Dawson 
from his position two days after he called in sick because of his failure to follow Entek’s 
company policy that required an employee to inform a supervisor at least one hour before a 
scheduled shift was to begin that the employee would be unable to work the shift.213 
 
 The majority maintained Dawson had failed to prove or properly argue his claim for 
hostile work environment due to sex.214  Dawson failed in this regard because he did not provide 
any persuasive evidence that he was being harassed due to a lack of gender conformity in the 
workplace.215  Furthermore, Dawson failed to meet the requirements set down by McDonnell 
Douglas.216  Thus, Dawson did not have a claim under Title VII for same-gender harassment.217  
Dawson helps to show how an LGBT individual must properly argue and present evidence by 
showing that an adverse action has taken place against him because of a failure to conform to 
gender stereotypes.218 
 
 8.  Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Company: Sexual harassment based on 
identity.219 
 
 In a sexual-harassment case, an LGBT individual must meet certain criteria to show that 
sexual discrimination occurred in the workplace.220  The criteria that must be met include 
showing how sexual harassment could adversely and pervasively alter a person’s conditions of 
employment.221  Bibby is a case where the plaintiff failed to take these criteria into 
consideration.222  While working for a Coca-Cola bottling plant in Philadelphia, Bibby was the 
target of harassment based in part on his sexual orientation.223  He alleged, in part, that his 
coworkers and supervisor regularly harassed him sexually.224  He filed a complaint with the 
Philadelphia Human Rights Commission and later requested the right to sue his employer and 
coworkers.225  Bibby’s request was granted, and he filed suit in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.226  After discovery had been conducted, Bibby’s employer filed a motion for 
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summary judgment, and the district court granted it.227  Bibby then filed an appeal with the Third 
Circuit of the Court of Appeals.228 
 
 Because the harassment was in large part due to Bibby’s sexual orientation, he was 
unable to show that the origin of the harassment was due to his gender.229  The majority 
proclaimed that Bibby failed to prove he was discriminated against under Title VII; the evidence 
showed, the majority maintained, the harassment was due to his sexual orientation, not because 
of his lack of gender conformity.230  Furthermore, the majority noted that once a party proves 
that he or she has been discriminated against because of a lack of gender conformity, the 
person’s sexual orientation is of no consequence.231  Bibby’s situation was very similar to the 
facts in Dawson, in that Dawson and Bibby were both harassed because of their sexual 
orientation and were both unable to show they were harassed because of gender.232 
 
 9.  Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.: Harassment based on sexual identity.233 
 
 When bringing a claim of sexual harassment under Title VII, an LGBT individual must 
be sure to distinguish discrimination based on sexual orientation and discrimination based on 
gender.  At New Balance Athletic Shoes, Inc. (New Balance), Higgins worked in the production 
facility and had few problems with the administration.234  However, a number of employees and 
supervisors sexually harassed Higgins based solely on his homosexuality.235  The sexual 
harassment Higgins experienced included derogatory and vulgar remarks.236  Due to several 
altercations with fellow employees, management at New Balance decided to fire Higgins, citing 
his lack of communication skills.237 
 
 Higgins lost, the majority asserted, because he failed to properly demonstrate, with a 
preponderance of evidence, his case under Title VII.238  When appealing the decision, Higgins 
brought forth two new theories based on Title VII’s requirement that harassment occur “because 
of . . . sex” and the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse.239  However, the majority 
maintained that Higgins had failed to properly present these theories when his case was tried at 
the district court, thereby negating Higgins’s new theories.240  The majority further proclaimed 
that Higgins failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove his case of sexual harassment as 
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denoted by Oncale, which requires a plaintiff to show that behavior is based on sex and is not 
merely offensive to the plaintiff.241 
 
 10.  Pedreira v. Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children, Inc.: Not allowing LGBT 
individuals to work at an establishment.242 
 
 When dealing with employment discrimination against LGBT individuals, employers 
with a certain set of religious beliefs sometimes object to employing them.  Vance, a lesbian, was 
a potential employee of Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children (KBHC) who joined a 
discrimination suit under Title VII alleging that KBHC’s practice of not hiring or employing 
LGBT individuals was illegal.243  Vance contended she was fully qualified for a job at KBHC 
caring for children, but because of KBHC’s policy that prohibited the employment of LGBT 
individuals, Vance was unable to work at KBHC.244 
 
 Because KBHC’s policy excluded LGBT individuals from its employment, Vance 
contended she had been discriminated against under Title VII.245  The majority opined that 
because Vance did not properly argue her case under Title VII, have standing under Title VII to 
allege that she was discriminated against because of her sex, or apply for the job in question, 
Vance’s claims under Title VII were moot.246 
 
D.  The district court cases that are associated with LGBT employment 
discrimination under Title VII 
 
 In this subsection, a presentation of a select number of district court cases that dealt with 
employment discrimination against LGBT individuals under Title VII shall be introduced.247 
 
1. Centola v. Potter: Delivering discrimination.248 
 
 When an LGBT individual files an employment-discrimination claim under Title VII, he 
or she must be sure to bring forth sufficient evidence to properly assert a claim of sex 
discrimination.  A plaintiff cannot simply make an allegation without any supporting evidence, 
but instead must provide a preponderance of proof to show that the plaintiff has been 
discriminated against due to gender or because of a failure to conform to gender stereotypes.249  
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Centola worked at the United States Post Office as a mail carrier for a number of years.250  While 
Centola was gay, he never revealed his homosexual status to his coworkers, but Centola’s 
coworkers still harassed him in a verbal nature and left sexually explicit items at his 
workstation.251  Centola’s coworkers treated him differently when compared to other coworkers; 
when Centola asked his coworkers to stop the harassment, they ignored his requests.252  Centola 
also informed his supervisors of the situation, but Centola’s supervisors did nothing to correct 
the situation.253  Centola filed suit against the United States Postal Service alleging, among 
several charges, that he had been sexually harassed and discharged from his job because he did 
not conform to the gender stereotypes held by his co-workers and because of his sex.254  The 
United States Postal Service contested Centola’s claims and filed a motion for summary 
judgment.255 
 
 After examining the evidence, Judge Gertner proclaimed Centola had a case for sexual 
harassment under Title VII because he had provided evidence that could provide an inference 
that he had been harassed based on gender and sex stereotyping, thereby negating a motion for 
summary judgement.256  Judge Gertner further opined that because Centola’s co-workers and 
supervisors were unaware of his sexual orientation, the United States Postal Service’s assertion 
that Centola’s discrimination was based on his sexual orientation was groundless.257 
 
 2.  Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club: Cooking discrimination.258 
 
 Commonly held ideals and misconceptions that are maintained by some about other 
groups can be, at times, hard to overcome.  Heller, a lesbian, worked for Columbia Edgewater 
(Columbia) as a cook.259  While working at Columbia, Heller, as well as several other openly gay 
coworkers and friends of Heller, were systematically harassed by her supervisor, Cagle, for 
failing to conform to typical gender stereotypes.260  Cagle’s alleged sexual harassment included 
derogatory comments, slurs, and questions concerning Heller’s gender non-conformity and 
sexuality with other parties.261  Cagle treated Heller, Heller’s friends, and the other openly gay 
employees differently when compared to the other employees at Columbia by making statements 
about their gender non-conformity and sexual orientations, thus adversely affecting Heller’s 
work environment.262 
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 Cagle further subjected Heller, Heller’s friends, and the other openly gay employees to 
more and harder work, and she was overly critical of Heller’s shift when the shift was doing 
work that was comparable to the other shifts.263  Heller was also written up several times by 
Cagle for actions that were typically overlooked when committed by heterosexual employees.264  
Eventually, Heller was fired by Cagle, who claimed that Heller failed to improve her 
performance after receiving the write-ups.265  After Heller’s termination, she filed suit against 
Columbia alleging that she was discriminated against because of sex as defined by Title VII.266 
 
 After considering all of the evidence, Judge Jelderks denied Columbia’s motion for 
summary judgement and proclaimed that Heller did have sufficient evidence to move forward in 
her Title VII harassment claims.267  Furthermore, Judge Jelderks maintained that Heller had 
provided sufficient evidence to show that she could have been harassed and discharged for lack 
of conforming to gender stereotypes, thus further negating Columbia’s assertions.268 
 
 Judge Jelderks maintained that as long as a supervisor’s conduct is pervasive enough to 
cause harassment, the exact number of times the behavior occurred is irrelevant.269  Judge 
Jelderks stressed that even though Cagle had not been physically threatening, this fact did not 
relieve Cagle or Columbia of liability under Title VII.270  Judge Jelderks also noted that Heller 
had asked Cagle to desist from the harassment, but the behavior continued.271  Furthermore, 
Judge Jelderks maintained that the testimony provided at court suggested animus emanating from 
Cagle towards Heller and her friends.272 
 
 3.  Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Group, Inc.: Discrimination based on an 
alleged lie.273 
 
 Some people automatically assume, without basis, that LGBT individuals lack morals 
and are prone to lie.  Lopez, a transgender person who lived her life completely as a female but 
was not yet a full female, applied for a job at River Oaks as a scheduler.274  Lopez filled out all 
of the necessary paperwork for the job at River Oaks with her female name and male name.275  
The interview and background check were successful, and Lopez was offered the position.276  
But upper management at River Oaks soon discovered Lopez’s transgender status.277  Citing 
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Lopez’s supposed deception about her gender on her application and background check, River 
Oaks revoked the job offer and Lopez filed suit.278 
 
 In concluding that Lopez did have a triable case of sex discrimination under Title VII, 
Judge Atlas stressed several facts presented to the court during a hearing pertaining to a motion 
for summary judgement that River Oaks filed.279  First, Judge Atlas maintained that Lopez had 
provided enough evidence for the claims made under Title VII to move forward.280  Second, 
despite River Oaks’s assertions to the contrary, Judge Atlas maintained that Lopez had provided 
both her male and female name on all of the relevant paperwork necessary to work at River 
Oaks, and that none of the parties associated with hiring Lopez were confused by the two names 
that were provided by Lopez.281  And third, Judge Atlas proclaimed that Lopez’s status as a 
transgender person did not bar a claim under Title VII, that River Oaks’s perception of Lopez did 
play a role in River Oaks’s decision not to hire Lopez, and because River Oaks viewed Lopez 
and other transgender individuals as not falling under typical gender profiles, the suit would 
move forward.282 
 
 4.  Schroer v. Billington: Making assumptions in the library.283 
 
 When examining a person’s history, one has a tendency to automatically make 
assumptions about the person based solely on the person’s past.  Schroer, a transgender 
individual who had just begun to put herself out as female, applied for a job at the Library of 
Congress (the Library).284  Schroer was highly qualified for the job, having an extensive military 
history and a top secret clearance.285  Before learning of Schroer’s status as a transgender 
individual, the Library offered the job to Schroer.286  However, upon learning that Schroer was a 
transgender individual, the Library secretly planned to revoke Schroer’s job offer based solely on 
Schroer’s status as a transgender individual and offer the job to another applicant.287 
 
 Representatives of the Library created several reasons why Schroer could not be hired by 
the Library.288  The Library’s alleged concerns were that Schroer would no longer have the 
necessary security clearance to work at the Library; that Schroer would lose her contacts and 
credibility to testify at Congress after making her transition from male to female; that Schroer’s 
transition would distract her co-workers; and that because Schroer lied to the Library about her 
transition from male to female, Schroer was not trustworthy.289  When Schroer learned why she 
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did not get the job at the Library, she filed suit against the Library alleging that the Library had 
committed sex discrimination under Title VII.290 
 
 In order to reach a determination on a motion for summary judgement filed by the 
Library, Judge Robertson examined arguments from both the Library and Schroer.291  After 
examining these arguments and the evidence produced by both parties that included depositions, 
testimony, and internal correspondence within the Library, Judge Robertson proclaimed that 
Schroer did have a claim for gender discrimination as defined by Title VII.292  To come to this 
conclusion, Judge Robertson noted that the reasons provided by the Library that included 
concerns over Schroer’s security clearance and Schroer losing vital contacts related to the job at 
the Library were pretextual, in that the Library had failed to properly determine if Schroer’s 
contacts and top secret clearance would be affected in an adverse way by her transgender 
status.293 
 
 Judge Robertson further stressed that the actions of Preece, the employee at the Library 
responsible for deciding if Schroer would be hired, was biased against Schroer and that Preece 
was only attempting to make an excuse not to hire Schroer because she did not fit into typical 
gender stereotypes.294  Judge Robertson declared that Schroer did have a triable case for gender 
discrimination under Title VII and denied the Library’s motion to dismiss Schroer’s claims 
because Schroer provided sufficient evidence and properly argued her case while also showing 
that the Library’s reasons for not hiring her were merely a pretext.295 
 
IV.  Final Thoughts 
 
 Employment discrimination against LGBT individuals is still a controversial issue within 
the United States, but the federal court system has taken important steps in preventing further 
discrimination.296  The Supreme Court has created a number of important tests and decisions, 
including a test of shifting burdens and how same-gender harassment is not permitted under Title 
VII, which have assisted in preventing workplace discrimination under Title VII.297  
Additionally, the Supreme Court created a test that allowed LGBT individuals to assert 
employment discrimination based on vicarious liability that would apply to an employer when a 
supervisor has direct control over an employee that is immediate.298 
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 Furthermore, when there is an employment action that tangibly results in a discharge, 
when there is a reassignment that is not desirable by an employee, or when there is a discharge of 
the employee, an employer cannot use an affirmative defense in a vicarious liability employment 
discrimination case.299  But the court system has not yet come to a consensus in how to deal with 
employment discrimination allegations brought by LGBT individuals, particularly when the 
discrimination is associated with sexual orientation.300 
 
 In order to be successful, an LGBT individual must assert that employment 
discrimination was because of gender or sex, a failure to conform to gender stereotypes, or 
because of sexual harassment.301  Typically, courts will not recognize an allegation of 
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation unless the discrimination can be shown 
to be similar to heterosexual employment discrimination.302  The claims that seem to have the 
most success involve discrimination against LGBT individuals who fail to conform to gender 
stereotypes.303 
 
 But success could prove to be elusive, for Title VII claims brought forth by LGBT 
individuals are still very difficult to prove.304  As Judge Gertner noted in Centola, if a person is 
stereotyped and the behavior results in discrimination because of his or her gender, then sexual 
orientation is irrelevant under Title VII and the employer has allowed itself to become liable 
under Title VII.305  Until such time as the court system comes to a consensus in how to decide 
employment-discrimination claims brought by LGBT individuals under Title VII, an easier 
remedy for LGBT individuals will be difficult to find. 
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